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From: rickert@cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Subject: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 04 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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Earlier arguments have been over my claim that an HLUT (Humongous
Look Up Table) device cannot emulate human behavior.
I must say that the debate has been interesting. Those who opposed
my position have repeatedly asserted the obviousness of my purported
error. Yet they have failed to give any coherent argument to
demonstrate such an error, and have instead descended to ad hominems
(charges of idiocy, and such).
Clearly my challenge was far too difficult for them to answer. I
therefore shall raise what should be a rather simpler challenge.
The question that I now pose is this:
Can the behavior of an ordinary desktop computer be emulated by
an HLUT system?
I am inclined to suspect that the answer is "no, it cannot be
emulated". However, I eagerly await a clear and convincing
demonstration that I am mistaken in this opinion.
We do need to be clear. I am not asking whether a processor can be
emulated by an HLUT. I think there is no important disagreement over
that. My challenge is with respect to an ordinary desktop computer,
considering the external inputs into that computer.
To avoid confusion, I shall make the problem more precise.
We consider a computer TARGET. Let's say that it is a pentium PC.
Its only external inputs are a standard ethernet card and a
keyboard. Inside it has rather typical hardware. I shall stipulate
that no data will ever be entered at the keyboard. (The keyboard is
only there so that the system won't hang during booting). The
question, then, is one of emulating the ethernet behavior. We assume
that the ethernet LAN is linked into the Internet.
We shall also suppose that there is another computer, HLUT, of
unspecified design. Those who would answer my challenge get to
design that system in their responses. It might be the fastest
imaginable future supercomputer.
The HLUT system is connected to the same ethernet, so that it can see
all of the packets too and from the TARGET system, and can detect all
network collisions. HLUT also has on its disks (a) a complete copy
of the initial contents of the disk drive of TARGET, including any
program code that it will run, (b) the manufacturers specifications
of all of the internal components of TARGET, (c) a complete copy of
the BIOS ROM code that TARGET uses to boot itself.
The HLUT system also has a very high speed ATM (or other) network
card. The problem for the HLUT system, is to predict the ethernet
output that will come from the TARGET system, and to transmit its
predicted output via ATM interface before the TARGET system actually
sends that output to its ethernet interface. The ATM interface is
allowed to be on a private network, not gatewayed into the Internet,
such that the TARGET system has no way of accessing the predictions
by HLUT.
I will stipulate that, for the duration of the test (say 1 year),
there are no disk drive crashes or other hardware failures and there
are no power outages. The challenge is only that HLUT predict the
outputs, in the correct sequence, before TARGET produces its
outputs. There is no requirement that HLUT gives exact timing as to
when the outputs will appear.
We can divide the challenge into two subproblems:
1: Is there a general algorithm that can be run on HLUT, using
the information about TARGET and the ethernet
input, such
that it could successfully predict the output
of TARGET.
2: Failing 1, can a persuasive case be made that once humans
have examined the programming of TARGET, they
could then
design a program to run on HLUT to predict its
output.
From: "Sergio Navega" <snavega@ibm.net>
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 04 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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Neil Rickert wrote in message <7bmnkn$2kl@ux.cs.niu.edu>...
>Earlier arguments have been over my claim that an HLUT (Humongous
>Look Up Table) device cannot emulate human behavior.
>
>I must say that the debate has been interesting. Those who opposed
>my position have repeatedly asserted the obviousness of my purported
>error. Yet they have failed to give any coherent argument to
>demonstrate such an error, and have instead descended to ad hominems
>(charges of idiocy, and such).
>
>Clearly my challenge was far too difficult for them to answer. I
>therefore shall raise what should be a rather simpler challenge.
>
>The question that I now pose is this:
>
> Can the behavior of an ordinary desktop computer be emulated by
> an HLUT system?
>
[snip]
Brilliant and thoughtful thought experiment, I suspect will cause
a damage to the opponent's arguments. I'm curious to read the sort
of reasoning that everybody will do about this.
At first, I became intrigued trying to understand why you relaxed
the condition of precise timing of the HLUT emulator. I thought
that demanding the same timing would put a severe constraint that
would make it easier to accept your conclusion.
On a second thought, I saw that this was not necessary. Even without
being forced to present the same timing, I would agree that the
HLUT computer will not be able to present the same responses in
a 1 year period. I suspect that, depending on the load of accesses
that came through the Ethernet cable, a couple of minutes would
be enough to raise the the difference between the systems to a
more than noticeable level.
And if one is allowed to "prepare" what goes through the ethernet,
I would say that a few transactions would be enough to make both
systems, from that moment to eternity, diverge completely.
Regards,
Sergio Navega.
From: Jim Balter <jqb@sandpiper.net>
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 05 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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Sergio Navega wrote:
>
> Neil Rickert wrote in message <7bmnkn$2kl@ux.cs.niu.edu>...
> >Earlier arguments have been over my claim that an HLUT (Humongous
> >Look Up Table) device cannot emulate human behavior.
> >
> >I must say that the debate has been interesting. Those who opposed
> >my position have repeatedly asserted the obviousness of my purported
> >error. Yet they have failed to give any coherent argument to
> >demonstrate such an error, and have instead descended to ad hominems
> >(charges of idiocy, and such).
> >
> >Clearly my challenge was far too difficult for them to answer. I
> >therefore shall raise what should be a rather simpler challenge.
> >
> >The question that I now pose is this:
> >
> > Can the behavior of an ordinary desktop computer be emulated
by
> > an HLUT system?
> >
>
> [snip]
>
> Brilliant and thoughtful thought experiment, I suspect will cause
> a damage to the opponent's arguments.
That's probably because you don't understand the nature of a HLUT
and the nature of the arguments.
> I'm curious to read the sort
> of reasoning that everybody will do about this.
It's nothing that hasn't been said before.
> At first, I became intrigued trying to understand why you relaxed
> the condition of precise timing of the HLUT emulator. I thought
> that demanding the same timing would put a severe constraint that
> would make it easier to accept your conclusion.
>
> On a second thought, I saw that this was not necessary. Even without
> being forced to present the same timing, I would agree that the
> HLUT computer will not be able to present the same responses in
> a 1 year period.
But it can *by definition*. You just don't understand what a HLUT is.
> I suspect that, depending on the load of accesses
> that came through the Ethernet cable, a couple of minutes would
> be enough to raise the the difference between the systems to a
> more than noticeable level.
"the systems"? A HLUT is a hypothetical construct. The HLUT in
question is that HLUT which produces the same results as the
target, not some other HLUT.
The claim is and has always been that there is, in the atemporal
theoretical mathematic sense, a HLUT that reproduces any given
observable behavior. There has never been any claim that some
person can build or produce such a thing "ex ante". Only the
God of Hypotheticals can do so.
This same strawman of "constructing" or "programming" a HLUT
keeps getting raised over an over again -- am I not justified
in feeling like you're acting like idiots?
> And if one is allowed to "prepare" what goes through the ethernet,
> I would say that a few transactions would be enough to make both
> systems, from that moment to eternity, diverge completely.
The relevant HLUT is one that doesn't diverge, not one that does.
There is no "ex ante" HLUT. Sheesh.
--
<J Q B>
From: "Sergio Navega" <snavega@ibm.net>
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 05 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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Jim Balter wrote in message <36DFA339.734E866F@sandpiper.net>...
>Sergio Navega wrote:
>>
>> Brilliant and thoughtful thought experiment, I suspect will cause
>> a damage to the opponent's arguments.
>
>That's probably because you don't understand the nature of a HLUT
>and the nature of the arguments.
>
Or else because there's something in this argument that's deeper
and was not addressed by you all.
>> I'm curious to read the sort
>> of reasoning that everybody will do about this.
>
>It's nothing that hasn't been said before.
>
Probably yes. These threads are very redundant.
>> At first, I became intrigued trying to understand why you relaxed
>> the condition of precise timing of the HLUT emulator. I thought
>> that demanding the same timing would put a severe constraint that
>> would make it easier to accept your conclusion.
>>
>> On a second thought, I saw that this was not necessary. Even without
>> being forced to present the same timing, I would agree that the
>> HLUT computer will not be able to present the same responses in
>> a 1 year period.
>
>But it can *by definition*. You just don't understand what a HLUT is.
>
This is important. If that specific HLUT you mention is able to
present the same responses than the system it's emulating, then
what you're trying to assert is that *there is such a HLUT even
in our imagination*. I have no problem with that, but let me ask
you to keep this result and read on.
>[snip]
>> And if one is allowed to "prepare" what goes through the ethernet,
>> I would say that a few transactions would be enough to make both
>> systems, from that moment to eternity, diverge completely.
>
>The relevant HLUT is one that doesn't diverge, not one that does.
>There is no "ex ante" HLUT. Sheesh.
>
Jim, I understand what you want to mean. I may even be
able to agree with your ponderings. I just want to
express that what you're saying *is not* addressing the
fundamental point that Neil had proposed. I'll humbly
try to clarify.
I agree, there is no way to come up with an "ex ante" HLUT.
I would say that everybody here in this discussion will
agree that we *cannot* find an "ex ante" HLUT for a system
(computer or human being) immersed in this complex world.
That's obviously not the problem.
Now what I think you and others are proposing is that
a HLUT can be constructed by the recording, with a
sufficiently fine-grained resolution, all aspects of
input/output of that system.
If this sounds too "practical" or infeasible, lets say
that there is a mathematical, imaginary HLUT able to
represent all the action/reaction pairs taken by that
system over a period of 1 year or a lifetime. There should
exist such a HLUT. I do not discuss this.
The claim at stake and the one I agree entirely is that
this recorded HLUT *cannot*, *by any means*, be "played back"
in such a way as to present intelligent behavior comparable
to the system it is emulating. There isn't any practical
condition that we're able to enforce such that the playback
(or "execution") of that HLUT will present comparable
behavior.
This HLUT is not much different than a very high resolution,
multitrack videocassette. A recorder of past actions.
To say that the HLUT is capable of reproducing equivalent
intelligent behavior assumes that we're able to "rewind"
the universe (backward time travel) and, even worse, that
the universe is totally deterministic (will run exactly
the same way as "before"). I believe those conditions to
be far more mind-boggling than the existence of that HLUT
in the first place.
Regards,
Sergio Navega.
From: modlin@concentric.net
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 04 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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In <7bmnkn$2kl@ux.cs.niu.edu>, rickert@cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
[challenge to emulate a computer with an HLUT snipped]
>We can divide the challenge into two subproblems:
>
> 1: Is there a general algorithm that can be run on HLUT,
using
> the information about TARGET and the ethernet
input, such
> that it could successfully predict the output of
TARGET.
>
> 2: Failing 1, can a persuasive case be made that once humans
> have examined the programming of TARGET, they
could then
> design a program to run on HLUT to predict its
output.
>
Neil, this clearly illustrates that you have not grasped the HLUT
concept.
NOBODY claims that there is such an algorithm, or that humans could
design such a program.
The whole of the HLUT thought experiment is to assume that a
complete list of all those predictions exists. Nobody designs
it, there is no algorithm to produce it, everyone knows that
it is impossible in practice. But assume for the sake of
discussion that this impossible thing exists.
GIVEN a complete list of all the responses that a computer will
make to all of its possible inputs, then the HLUT will mimic the
computer externally in every detail, and the question is then
the philosophical one of whether it could be said to be
"really" computing as it looks up all these answers.
Your challenge is quite beside the point.
Bill Modlin
From: rickert@cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 04 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
Message-ID: <7bnldu$4bb@ux.cs.niu.edu>
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modlin@concentric.net writes:
>In <7bmnkn$2kl@ux.cs.niu.edu>, rickert@cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>[challenge to emulate a computer with an HLUT snipped]
>>We can divide the challenge into two subproblems:
>> 1: Is there a general algorithm that can be run on
HLUT, using
>> the information about TARGET and the ethernet
input, such
>> that it could successfully predict the output
of TARGET.
>> 2: Failing 1, can a persuasive case be made that once
humans
>> have examined the programming of TARGET, they
could then
>> design a program to run on HLUT to predict
its output.
>Neil, this clearly illustrates that you have not grasped the HLUT
>concept.
>NOBODY claims that there is such an algorithm, or that humans could
>design such a program.
In that case, there could be no basis for the HLUT claim. Any proof
of the validity of the HLUT claim would, in effect, constitute an
algorithm for generating the contents of the table, although perhaps
not an algorithm that could actually be implemented on practical
computers. (Recall that I did not require that the HLUT computer be
a practical machine). So let's just take the HLUT claim for what it
is -- a piece of ideology which some people fervently believe, but
which nobody can justify.
>The whole of the HLUT thought experiment is to assume that a
>complete list of all those predictions exists. Nobody designs
>it, there is no algorithm to produce it, everyone knows that
>it is impossible in practice. But assume for the sake of
>discussion that this impossible thing exists.
Then, for the sake or our discussions, why not just assume that
miracles and magic exist. Perhaps we can do it all with a crystal
ball, and we don't need anything as cumbersome as an HLUT.
You are making the HLUT argument into an absurdity. Unless it could
be demonstrated that an HLUT could exist in principle, it would have
no relevance to the questions for which it is raised. If you are not
satisfied with my 1: and 2: above, I can offer a third alternative
3: At least give a clear and convincing proof of the existence
of a program to run on HLUT.
>GIVEN a complete list of all the responses that a computer will
>make to all of its possible inputs, then the HLUT will mimic the
>computer externally in every detail, and the question is then
>the philosophical one of whether it could be said to be
>"really" computing as it looks up all these answers.
You would have to first establish that there could be such a complete
(finite) list.
>Your challenge is quite beside the point.
In other words, you are clueless on this, yet idealogically
committed, and serving up only empty rhetoric.
From: Jim Balter <jqb@sandpiper.net>
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 05 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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Neil Rickert wrote:
>
> modlin@concentric.net writes:
>
> >In <7bmnkn$2kl@ux.cs.niu.edu>, rickert@cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>
> >[challenge to emulate a computer with an HLUT snipped]
>
> >>We can divide the challenge into two subproblems:
>
> >> 1: Is there a general algorithm that can be run on
HLUT, using
> >> the information about TARGET and the
ethernet input, such
> >> that it could successfully predict the
output of TARGET.
>
> >> 2: Failing 1, can a persuasive case be made that
once humans
> >> have examined the programming of TARGET,
they could then
> >> design a program to run on HLUT to
predict its output.
>
> >Neil, this clearly illustrates that you have not grasped the HLUT
> >concept.
>
> >NOBODY claims that there is such an algorithm, or that humans could
> >design such a program.
>
> In that case,
"In that case"? "In that case"? Where the hell have you
been?
My God, what a jackass you are.
> there could be no basis for the HLUT claim. Any proof
> of the validity of the HLUT claim would, in effect, constitute an
> algorithm for generating the contents of the table,
"NOBODY claims there is such an algorithm". You just don't
get it. That *isn't* the "HLUT claim". It's a fucking
*existence proof*.
> In other words, you are clueless on this, yet idealogically
> committed, and serving up only empty rhetoric.
Talk about clueless!
--
<J Q B>
From: rickert@cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 05 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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Jim Balter <jqb@sandpiper.net> writes:
>> there could be no basis for the HLUT claim. Any proof
>> of the validity of the HLUT claim would, in effect, constitute an
>> algorithm for generating the contents of the table,
>"NOBODY claims there is such an algorithm". You just don't
>get it. That *isn't* the "HLUT claim". It's a fucking
>*existence proof*.
There is no existence proof, whether fucking or otherwise. There is
just an incredible ideogical committment to this among some very
confused people.
Behavior is something real that occurs in the world. At best you
could have an existence proof for an HLUT that matches a suitably
constrained formal specification of behavior. But that would utterly
beg the question of whether behavior is formally specifiable within
those constraints, or even whether behavior is formally specifiable
at all.
From: Jim Balter <jqb@sandpiper.net>
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 05 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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Neil Rickert wrote:
>
> Earlier arguments have been over my claim that an HLUT (Humongous
> Look Up Table) device cannot emulate human behavior.
>
> I must say that the debate has been interesting. Those who opposed
> my position have repeatedly asserted the obviousness of my purported
> error. Yet they have failed to give any coherent argument to
> demonstrate such an error,
That's a lie.
> and have instead descended to ad hominems
> (charges of idiocy, and such).
You started the ad hominems and continue with them into this message.
I didn't say you're an idiot, I said you're *acting* like one.
> Clearly my challenge was far too difficult for them to answer.
That is the sort of ad hominem crap you have littered this discussion
with all along.
> I am inclined to suspect that the answer is "no, it cannot be
> emulated". However, I eagerly await a clear and convincing
> demonstration that I am mistaken in this opinion.
You have repeatedly failed to accept straightforward demonstrations;
why should things change?
> 1: Is there a general algorithm that can be run on
HLUT, using
> the information about TARGET and the
ethernet input, such
> that it could successfully predict
the output of TARGET.
The general HLUT algorithm is:
forever: (state, output) = table[state, input]
For any particular finite stream of outputs from TARGET,
there exists a HLUT that will produce the output with
no inputs at all. That satisfies the requirement,
since *in principle* some HLUT could produce the required
prediction for any given instance of TARGET. But no doubt you want
to take the same HLUT and test it again. Well, if there
is a deterministic relationship between the inputs and
the outputs, then that means there is an abstract
(infinite) mapping. Given a finite period (1 year)
and a finite time density of inputs, there are only finite
many (n) input streams. Each of these, ISi, has a corresponding
(by the deterministic relationship) output stream, OSi.
There is, by definition, a finite HLUT that maps
(i = 1..n) ISi -> OSi.
If there is not a deterministic relationship, then there is
a nondeterministic mapping such that, for each
ISi there are several possible OSij, each of which occurs
REPj times. A HLUT which, for each ISi, produced the OSij
with maximum REPj would have maximal probability of matching
TARGET's outputs. Over a series of trials, it will do at least
as well as any other predictor.
> 2: Failing 1, can a persuasive case be made that
once humans
> have examined the programming of
TARGET, they could then
> design a program to run on HLUT to
predict its output.
No, for the umpteenth time, no one can design a HLUT.
Once again, you have paid no attention to what has been said.
--
<J Q B>
From: rickert@cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 05 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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Jim Balter <jqb@sandpiper.net> writes:
>Neil Rickert wrote:
>> Earlier arguments have been over my claim that an HLUT (Humongous
>> Look Up Table) device cannot emulate human behavior.
>> I must say that the debate has been interesting. Those who opposed
>> my position have repeatedly asserted the obviousness of my purported
>> error. Yet they have failed to give any coherent argument to
>> demonstrate such an error,
>That's a lie.
There is no lie. Your side of the argument has made many claims, but
has failed to provide justifying arguments.
>> and have instead descended to ad hominems
>> (charges of idiocy, and such).
>You started the ad hominems and continue with them into this message.
>I didn't say you're an idiot, I said you're *acting* like one.
>> Clearly my challenge was far too difficult for them to answer.
>That is the sort of ad hominem crap you have littered this discussion
>with all along.
It is more like gentle teasing.
>> I am inclined to suspect that the answer is "no, it cannot be
>> emulated". However, I eagerly await a clear and convincing
>> demonstration that I am mistaken in this opinion.
>You have repeatedly failed to accept straightforward demonstrations;
>why should things change?
Just provide the straightforward demonstrations (if you can).
>> 1: Is there a general algorithm that can be run
on HLUT, using
>> the information about TARGET and
the ethernet input, such
>> that it could successfully
predict the output of TARGET.
>The general HLUT algorithm is:
> forever: (state, output) = table[state, input]
Finally, the beginnings of an argument.
>For any particular finite stream of outputs from TARGET,
>...
> ...
Well,
if there
^^^^^^^^
>is a deterministic relationship between the inputs and
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>the outputs, then that means there is an abstract
^^^^^^^^^^^
Aha. A crucial assumption which has not previously been mentioned in
all of the purported arguments given. No if you would kindly oblige
us by establishing a basis for this assumption, perhaps we can make
progress.
>If there is not a deterministic relationship, then there is
>a nondeterministic mapping such that, for each
>ISi there are several possible OSij, each of which occurs
>REPj times. A HLUT which, for each ISi, produced the OSij
>with maximum REPj would have maximal probability of matching
>TARGET's outputs. Over a series of trials, it will do at least
>as well as any other predictor.
Perhaps there is virtually no repetition. In that case, your HLUT
may not do better than a random number generator.
Evidently you cannot deal with the non-deterministic case. At best
you can claim that no other predictor will do better. However, the
original system is a perfect emulator of its own behavior. So the
original system does do better at emulating itself than could any
HLUT.
So, we finally see that the HLUT argument is based an the assumption
of a deterministic relation between inputs and outputs.
I now await your justification for making such an assumption.
From: "Sergio Navega" <snavega@ibm.net>
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 05 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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Neil Rickert wrote in message <7bp138$5jj@ux.cs.niu.edu>...
>Jim Balter <jqb@sandpiper.net> writes:
>
>>For any particular finite stream of outputs from TARGET,
>>...
>
>> ...
Well,
if there
>
^^^^^^^^
>>is a deterministic relationship between the inputs and
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>>the outputs, then that means there is an abstract
> ^^^^^^^^^^^
>
>Aha. A crucial assumption which has not previously been mentioned in
>all of the purported arguments given. No if you would kindly oblige
>us by establishing a basis for this assumption, perhaps we can make
>progress.
>
If you allow me, I would like to say Aha! too. I suggest that Jim
and Daryl rethink their whole argumentations without assuming the
necessity of determinism. I'm inclined to think that they may end
agreeing with Neil, at least in the problem presented at the
beginning of this thread.
Regards,
Sergio Navega.
From: rickert@cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 05 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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"Sergio Navega" <snavega@ibm.net> writes:
>Neil Rickert wrote in message <7bp138$5jj@ux.cs.niu.edu>...
>>Jim Balter <jqb@sandpiper.net> writes:
>>>For any particular finite stream of outputs from TARGET,
>>>...
>>> ...
Well,
if there
>>
^^^^^^^^
>>>is a deterministic relationship between the inputs and
>> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>>>the outputs, then that means there is an abstract
>> ^^^^^^^^^^^
>>Aha. A crucial assumption which has not previously been mentioned in
>>all of the purported arguments given. No if you would kindly oblige
>>us by establishing a basis for this assumption, perhaps we can make
>>progress.
>If you allow me, I would like to say Aha! too. I suggest that Jim
>and Daryl rethink their whole argumentations without assuming the
>necessity of determinism. I'm inclined to think that they may end
>agreeing with Neil, at least in the problem presented at the
>beginning of this thread.
I would claim that:
(a) Human behavior is not deterministic (in the sense in which Jim
defined the term);
(b) Human behavior does considerably better than what you would get
by making a random selection from a deterministically
chosen
set of alternatives;
(c) The characteristics given in (a) and (b) have a great deal to
do with what we mean by "intelligent."
Incidently, my HLUT challenge was intended to make the point that the
behavior of a desktop computer need not be deterministic (in the
sense of Jim's definition).
From: Jim Balter <jqb@sandpiper.net>
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 11 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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Neil Rickert wrote:
>
> "Sergio Navega" <snavega@ibm.net> writes:
> >Neil Rickert wrote in message <7bp138$5jj@ux.cs.niu.edu>...
> >>Jim Balter <jqb@sandpiper.net> writes:
>
> >>>For any particular finite stream of outputs from TARGET,
> >>>...
>
> >>> ...
Well,
if there
> >>
^^^^^^^^
> >>>is a deterministic relationship between the inputs and
> >> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> >>>the outputs, then that means there is an abstract
> >> ^^^^^^^^^^^
>
> >>Aha. A crucial assumption which has not previously been mentioned in
> >>all of the purported arguments given. No if you would kindly oblige
> >>us by establishing a basis for this assumption, perhaps we can make
> >>progress.
>
> >If you allow me, I would like to say Aha! too. I suggest that Jim
> >and Daryl rethink their whole argumentations without assuming the
> >necessity of determinism. I'm inclined to think that they may end
> >agreeing with Neil, at least in the problem presented at the
> >beginning of this thread.
>
> I would claim that:
>
> (a) Human behavior is not deterministic (in the sense in which Jim
> defined the term);
I doubt that you understood it, since of course human behavior is
not deterministic -- we possess no deterministic model of human
behavior.
But perhaps some day we will, in which case human behavior will be
deterministic. However, given the apparent chaotic nature of the
brain, it is unlikely that any deterministic model of the brain
can be developed (which is not to say that it is impossible in theory,
although QM may well rule *that* out).
> (b) Human behavior does considerably better than what you would get
> by making a random selection from a
deterministically chosen
> set of alternatives;
Not if the "deterministically chosen", whatever that means, set of
alternatives always contained exactly one member, namely the best
(whatever *that* means) one.
> (c) The characteristics given in (a) and (b) have a great deal to
> do with what we mean by "intelligent."
Certainly "doing better than random" has a great deal to do with
what we mean by "intelligent", but that's rather vacuous.
> Incidently, my HLUT challenge was intended to make the point that the
> behavior of a desktop computer need not be deterministic (in the
> sense of Jim's definition).
A system is non-deterministic if we have no predictive model of it;
it isn't an intrinsic attribute above the quantum level.
You are in an essentialist rut on this issue.
--
<J Q B>
From: daryl@cogentex.com (Daryl McCullough)
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 05 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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Sergio says...
>If you allow me, I would like to say Aha! too. I suggest that Jim
>and Daryl rethink their whole argumentations without assuming the
>necessity of determinism. I'm inclined to think that they may end
>agreeing with Neil, at least in the problem presented at the
>beginning of this thread.
Determinism is a red-herring. It is completely irrelevant to the
argument. If (for whatever reason) you want nondeterministic
behavior, make one of the inputs be a random number generator.
Besides, there is no observable difference between a deterministic
system and a nondeterministic system. Perhaps you (and Neil) are
thinking of determinism in terms of the *last* input:
1. Q: What is your name?
2. A: Fred Sanders
3. Q: What is your name?
4. A: I already told you, my name is Fred Sanders.
If an AI program responded exactly the same to the second
question as to the first, then it would definitely not
be behaving much like a human. But, as has been explained
many times, the inputs to the HLUT is the entire *sequence*
of inputs received up to the present time, not just the
last one. So there is no problem in making the response
to the sequence: <"What is your name?", "What is your name">
be different from the response to the sequence
<"What is your name?">.
Daryl McCullough
CoGenTex, Inc.
Ithaca, NY
From: rickert@cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 05 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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daryl@cogentex.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
>>If you allow me, I would like to say Aha! too. I suggest that Jim
>>and Daryl rethink their whole argumentations without assuming the
>>necessity of determinism. I'm inclined to think that they may end
>>agreeing with Neil, at least in the problem presented at the
>>beginning of this thread.
>Determinism is a red-herring. It is completely irrelevant to the
>argument. If (for whatever reason) you want nondeterministic
>behavior, make one of the inputs be a random number generator.
No, that is wrong. The claim has been that an HLUT can emulate a
system. Since the HLUT is deterministic, this is relevant. For an
HLUT cannot emulate a non-deterministic system.
>
Perhaps
you (and Neil) are
>thinking of determinism in terms of the *last* input:
I am certainly not doing that.
From: Jim Balter <jqb@sandpiper.net>
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 11 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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Neil Rickert wrote:
>
> daryl@cogentex.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
>
> >>If you allow me, I would like to say Aha! too. I suggest that Jim
> >>and Daryl rethink their whole argumentations without assuming the
> >>necessity of determinism. I'm inclined to think that they may end
> >>agreeing with Neil, at least in the problem presented at the
> >>beginning of this thread.
>
> >Determinism is a red-herring. It is completely irrelevant to the
> >argument. If (for whatever reason) you want nondeterministic
> >behavior, make one of the inputs be a random number generator.
>
> No, that is wrong. The claim has been that an HLUT can emulate a
> system. Since the HLUT is deterministic, this is relevant. For an
> HLUT cannot emulate a non-deterministic system.
The inputs to a HLUT need not be (and presumably are not) deterministic.
And in terms of reproducing a device that is non-deterministic in the
sense that we have no deterministic model of it, this is not an issue
because the existence of a HLUT (the set of such HLUTs is not empty)
that duplicates the actual behavior of that device is in no way
dependent upon *our* being able to determine its behavior. Set-wise
existence, which is form of the HLUT claim, is *atemporal* --
determinism has no applicability.
There is also a meaning of "[non-]deterministic" that appears in
connection with machine models, e.g., deterministic and
nondeterministic TMs. But a non-deterministic TM is just one that
allows multiple successor states. Any non-deterministic TM
computes the same function as some deterministic TM. Or, in other
words, any non-deterministic TM can be emulated by some deterministic
TM.
Whatever Neil means by "a non-deterministic system", if he even has
a well-formed notion in mind, his claim is false. And it can't be
rescued by accusing me of ideological commitments or other such ad
hominem trash. The validity of claims simply isn't subject to such
petty concerns.
--
<J Q B>
From: rickert@cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 15 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
Message-ID: <7cjdsk$9gk@ux.cs.niu.edu>
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Jim Balter <jqb@sandpiper.net> writes:
>Neil Rickert wrote:
>> No, that is wrong. The claim has been that an HLUT can emulate a
>> system. Since the HLUT is deterministic, this is relevant. For an
>> HLUT cannot emulate a non-deterministic system.
>The inputs to a HLUT need not be (and presumably are not) deterministic.
Completely irrelevant to the points that were being discussed.
>And in terms of reproducing a device that is non-deterministic in the
>sense that we have no deterministic model of it, this is not an issue
>because the existence of a HLUT (the set of such HLUTs is not empty)
>that duplicates the actual behavior of that device is in no way
>dependent upon *our* being able to determine its behavior. Set-wise
>existence, which is form of the HLUT claim, is *atemporal* --
>determinism has no applicability.
Notice how Balter has dishonestly attempted to distort the question.
It was never a question about "*our* being able to determine its
behavior."
>There is also a meaning of "[non-]deterministic" that appears in
>connection with machine models, e.g., deterministic and
>nondeterministic TMs. ....
This is another pointless misdirection.
>Whatever Neil means by "a non-deterministic system", if he even has
>a well-formed notion in mind, his claim is false.
Clearly Balter is not interested in what I meant, for he has worked
real hard at obfuscating it.
>
And
it can't be
>rescued by accusing me of ideological commitments or other such ad
>hominem trash.
I will let the record speak for itself.
From: "Sergio Navega" <snavega@ibm.net>
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 05 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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Daryl McCullough wrote in message <7bp7ld$dgj@edrn.newsguy.com>...
>Sergio says...
>
>>If you allow me, I would like to say Aha! too. I suggest that Jim
>>and Daryl rethink their whole argumentations without assuming the
>>necessity of determinism. I'm inclined to think that they may end
>>agreeing with Neil, at least in the problem presented at the
>>beginning of this thread.
>
>Determinism is a red-herring. It is completely irrelevant to the
>argument. If (for whatever reason) you want nondeterministic
>behavior, make one of the inputs be a random number generator.
>
No, I don't want a nondeterministic HLUT. What I'm saying is that
the world in which this HLUT was generated is nondeterministic.
If you don't want to talk about the construction of the HLUT,
ok, lets forget how we made it. Lets just think of that mathematical
concept of a HLUT that is a reliable copy of every single if/then
condition of the life of one intelligent being, down to the
femtosecond level.
This HLUT will not present intelligent behavior, because this
HLUT *does not capture the invariant properties* of that world.
It captures what happened during one "instance" of that world,
and that instance will never repeat again. Because of
indeterminacy. The HLUT may receive as input a known vector
but its response will be something that may be not appropriate
for that "run".
>Besides, there is no observable difference between a deterministic
>system and a nondeterministic system. Perhaps you (and Neil) are
>thinking of determinism in terms of the *last* input:
>
> 1. Q: What is your name?
> 2. A: Fred Sanders
>
> 3. Q: What is your name?
> 4. A: I already told you, my name is Fred Sanders.
>
>If an AI program responded exactly the same to the second
>question as to the first, then it would definitely not
>be behaving much like a human. But, as has been explained
>many times, the inputs to the HLUT is the entire *sequence*
>of inputs received up to the present time, not just the
>last one. So there is no problem in making the response
>to the sequence: <"What is your name?", "What is your name">
>be different from the response to the sequence
><"What is your name?">.
>
me propose a different dialog. Questions 1 and 2 are
the same you wrote. Here's my replacements:
3. Q: What is your name?
4. A: Freddy.
I hope you're not afraid of highly hypothetical situations,
because that's what I'll do now (please, try to find the
valuable gist in the middle of the absurd I'm about to write;
this whole story of HLUTs is so out-of-mind that I'm not
ashamed to propose this).
Suppose that this conversation was taking place in a subway.
The noise level was really big, in a manner as to leave human
voices almost inaudible. Suppose, further, that Fred was not
sure that his phrase 2 had been fully understood. But this
"feeling" of Fred was really on the edge. In fact, it was
so in the edge that what made Fred decide that he wasn't
being heard was a *single* molecule of nitrogen vibrating
because of sound that made a difference in a cluster of vibrating
molecules that made a difference in his tympanum that made a
difference in his auditory circuit that made a difference in
his cortex that was exactly in the position of deciding for
that issue.
In another "instance" of this world, this nitrogen molecule,
due to indeterminacy, may make that difference not meaningful.
If this seems absurdly unlikely, think that every atom and
every molecule of us (including the firing rate of our neurons)
and of this universe is being driven by similar situations.
A HLUT does not have the "capacity" to *abstract* the invariant
(or highly constant) aspects of this universe, and then will
always answer with fixed things that, due to context, may even
be inapropriate.
Regards,
Sergio Navega.
From: daryl@cogentex.com (Daryl McCullough)
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 05 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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Sergio says...
>If you don't want to talk about the construction of the HLUT,
>ok, lets forget how we made it. Lets just think of that mathematical
>concept of a HLUT that is a reliable copy of every single if/then
>condition of the life of one intelligent being, down to the
>femtosecond level.
>
>This HLUT will not present intelligent behavior, because this
>HLUT *does not capture the invariant properties* of that world.
>It captures what happened during one "instance" of that world,
>and that instance will never repeat again.
No, the HLUT by assumption has an appropriate response for all
*possible* instances of the world.
[stuff deleted]
>A HLUT does not have the "capacity" to *abstract* the invariant
>(or highly constant) aspects of this universe, and then will
>always answer with fixed things that, due to context, may even
>be inapropriate.
A different context is a different input, and the HLUT will
produce a different output.
Daryl McCullough
CoGenTex, Inc.
Ithaca, NY
From: houlepn@my-dejanews.com
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 06 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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"Sergio Navega" <snavega@ibm.net> wrote:
<snip>
[S. NAVEGA]
> Let me propose a different dialog. Questions 1 and 2 are
> the same you wrote. Here's my replacements:
>
> 3. Q: What is your name?
> 4. A: Freddy.
>
> I hope you're not afraid of highly hypothetical situations,
> because that's what I'll do now (please, try to find the
> valuable gist in the middle of the absurd I'm about to write;
> this whole story of HLUTs is so out-of-mind that I'm not
> ashamed to propose this).
>
> Suppose that this conversation was taking place in a subway.
> The noise level was really big, in a manner as to leave human
> voices almost inaudible. Suppose, further, that Fred was not
> sure that his phrase 2 had been fully understood. But this
> "feeling" of Fred was really on the edge. In fact, it was
> so in the edge that what made Fred decide that he wasn't
> being heard was a *single* molecule of nitrogen vibrating
> because of sound that made a difference in a cluster of vibrating
> molecules that made a difference in his tympanum that made a
> difference in his auditory circuit that made a difference in
> his cortex that was exactly in the position of deciding for
> that issue.
>
> In another "instance" of this world, this nitrogen molecule,
> due to indeterminacy, may make that difference not meaningful.
>
> If this seems absurdly unlikely, think that every atom and
> every molecule of us (including the firing rate of our neurons)
> and of this universe is being driven by similar situations.
>
> A HLUT does not have the "capacity" to *abstract* the invariant
> (or highly constant) aspects of this universe, and then will
> always answer with fixed things that, due to context, may even
> be inapropriate.
[PNH]
I would like to propose another way of looking at this problem
because I don't think what you say contradicts Daryl McCullough's
viewpoint.
Lets consider some finite time period of length T in the life of
Freddy in whitch he grows, learns, sleeps, etc. Consider now the
state vector of the universe |U_i> at the beginning of this time
period. This could be factored into |environment_i> x |Freddy_i>.
How will Freddy answer question Q at time i + t (t < T) ? Use the
following algorythm:
1) Apply the unitary time evolution operator to |U_i> to get |U_i+t>
2) Factor |U_i+t> into |environment_i+t> x |Freddy_i+t> (this tricky
step might require more intelligence than Freddy actually possess ;)
3) Identify some possible state of the environment that encodes question
Q at time t: |environment_Q>. This is the input state vector.
4) Identify some possible state of Freddy that encodes answer A at time
t+dt : |Freddy_A>. (Ignore states like |Freddy_just_died> or
|Freddy_has_been_turned_into_a _cow_due_to_some_weird_quantum_
_fluctuation>)
4) Let Freddy ponder the question for a time interval dt of a few
seconds. That is: compute |U_i+t+dt> and get the probability
of Freddy's answer being A as the coefficient of the output state
vector |Freddy_A> in the normalized ket:
<environment_Q+dt|U_i+t+dt>.
Use this algorythm to compute the probability p(Q,A) for all possible
distinguishable Q/A pairs at all times intervals dt in the time
period (i,i+T). Call the resulting matrix "Freddy's FAQ" or view it
as as Freddy's quantum HLUT.
To implement (in thought!) this HLUT follow Daryl's suggestion and make
one of it's input a random number generator used to give answer A to
question Q with probability p(Q,A).
Note 1) The formal problem of Freddy becoming entangled with the
environment during the time interval in which it ponders the question
(and thus blurring the distinction between |Fred> and |environment>)
could be minimized by having him isolated in a dull static room and
interacting with his environment through a terminal for the whole
period T considered in the definition of the HLUT (just as in the
original Turing proposal). The only important entanglement would
then mainly be between Freddy and the informational content of the
question asked (And this is essential if we wish Freddy to answer at all!)
Note 2) We do not have to worry about Freddy's particular past
histories (including everything that could posibly happen to him in
his room) as these are all contained in |U_i> (and the unitary operator).
Note 3) This is a thought experiment intended to provide an existence
proof in the mathematical sense. For instance, we will never know |U>
but we can assume it exists. I think is is agreed that HLUTs will
not be implemented ever. (This is why they are called HLUTs rather than
LUTs I guess?)
Regards,
Pierre-Normand Houle
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From: "Sergio Navega" <snavega@ibm.net>
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 06 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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houlepn@my-dejanews.com wrote in message
<7bq3ke$sgb$1@nnrp1.dejanews.com>...
>"Sergio Navega" <snavega@ibm.net> wrote:
>
><snip>
>
>[S. NAVEGA]
>> Let me propose a different dialog. Questions 1 and 2 are
>> the same you wrote. Here's my replacements:
>>
>> 3. Q: What is your name?
>> 4. A: Freddy.
>>[snip]
>[PNH]
>I would like to propose another way of looking at this problem
>because I don't think what you say contradicts Daryl McCullough's
>viewpoint.
>
>Lets consider some finite time period of length T in the life of
>Freddy in whitch he grows, learns, sleeps, etc. Consider now the
>state vector of the universe |U_i> at the beginning of this time
>period. This could be factored into |environment_i> x |Freddy_i>.
>How will Freddy answer question Q at time i + t (t < T) ? Use the
>following algorythm:
>
Pierre-Normand, would you read the answer I gave to Daryl? I think
my point there applies equally well to your comments.
Regards,
Sergio Navega.
From: daryl@cogentex.com (Daryl McCullough)
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 05 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
Message-ID: <7bp2lm$492@edrn.newsguy.com>
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Sergio says...
>Now what I think you and others are proposing is that
>a HLUT can be constructed by the recording, with a
>sufficiently fine-grained resolution, all aspects of
>input/output of that system.
No. Nobody is suggesting any method for constructing
an HLUT whatsoever.
>If this sounds too "practical" or infeasible, lets say
>that there is a mathematical, imaginary HLUT able to
>represent all the action/reaction pairs taken by that
>system over a period of 1 year or a lifetime. There should
>exist such a HLUT. I do not discuss this.
>The claim at stake and the one I agree entirely is that
>this recorded HLUT *cannot*, *by any means*, be "played back"
>in such a way as to present intelligent behavior comparable
>to the system it is emulating. There isn't any practical
>condition that we're able to enforce such that the playback
>(or "execution") of that HLUT will present comparable
>behavior.
Everybody agrees that implementing and executing such an
HLUT is not practical.
>This HLUT is not much different than a very high resolution,
>multitrack videocassette. A recorder of past actions.
Not quite. It is a table of pairs <input_history,next_output>.
The input history can be thought of as a very high resolution
multitrack videocassette (if we limit the HLUT to just audiovisual
inputs). The HLUT, by definition, has a next_output for *every*
possible input_history; that is, for every possible videocassette.
If the videocassette is digital, and we only consider videocassettes
of length less than 100 years, then there are only finitely many
possible videocassettes.
>To say that the HLUT is capable of reproducing equivalent
>intelligent behavior assumes that we're able to "rewind"
>the universe (backward time travel) and, even worse, that
>the universe is totally deterministic (will run exactly
>the same way as "before").
No, it doesn't assume any such thing. The HLUT makes no
assumptions about the universe being deterministic. The
HLUT itself is deterministic, although that can easily
be changed by allowing one of its inputs be from a
random number generator.
The HLUT is simply a huge if-then-else table, each line
being of the form:
If [such and such happens] then [do this]
Else if [this other thing happens] then [do that]
.
.
.
Such a table doesn't presuppose that the world is
deterministic.
Daryl McCullough
CoGenTex, Inc.
Ithaca, NY
From: "Sergio Navega" <snavega@ibm.net>
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 05 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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Daryl McCullough wrote in message <7bp2lm$492@edrn.newsguy.com>...
>Sergio says...
>
>>Now what I think you and others are proposing is that
>>a HLUT can be constructed by the recording, with a
>>sufficiently fine-grained resolution, all aspects of
>>input/output of that system.
>
>No. Nobody is suggesting any method for constructing
>an HLUT whatsoever.
>
So I'm correct in saying that you're thinking about the
existence of a mathematical entity, a HLUT, conceived by,
lets say for the sake of argumentation, a "Goedel-free" god
outside of this universe, which would present the same
behavior than the entity being analyzed. That's what
I'm perceiving as problematic: this is equivalent as
having a recording of all entries and playing them back.
And that's what I'm inclined to say is not possible.
>>If this sounds too "practical" or infeasible, lets say
>>that there is a mathematical, imaginary HLUT able to
>>represent all the action/reaction pairs taken by that
>>system over a period of 1 year or a lifetime. There should
>>exist such a HLUT. I do not discuss this.
>
>>The claim at stake and the one I agree entirely is that
>>this recorded HLUT *cannot*, *by any means*, be "played back"
>>in such a way as to present intelligent behavior comparable
>>to the system it is emulating. There isn't any practical
>>condition that we're able to enforce such that the playback
>>(or "execution") of that HLUT will present comparable
>>behavior.
>
>Everybody agrees that implementing and executing such an
>HLUT is not practical.
>
Now the question is not of practicality. It is of impossibility.
And the root of the problem, by my current understanding of
it, is the indeterminacy of the universe.
>>This HLUT is not much different than a very high resolution,
>>multitrack videocassette. A recorder of past actions.
>
>Not quite. It is a table of pairs <input_history,next_output>.
>The input history can be thought of as a very high resolution
>multitrack videocassette (if we limit the HLUT to just audiovisual
>inputs). The HLUT, by definition, has a next_output for *every*
>possible input_history; that is, for every possible videocassette.
>If the videocassette is digital, and we only consider videocassettes
>of length less than 100 years, then there are only finitely many
>possible videocassettes.
>
I may agree with the finiteness you propose. What I don't agree
is that this HLUT will present the same behavior when subject to
a "second run". More on this follows.
>>To say that the HLUT is capable of reproducing equivalent
>>intelligent behavior assumes that we're able to "rewind"
>>the universe (backward time travel) and, even worse, that
>>the universe is totally deterministic (will run exactly
>>the same way as "before").
>
>No, it doesn't assume any such thing. The HLUT makes no
>assumptions about the universe being deterministic. The
>HLUT itself is deterministic, although that can easily
>be changed by allowing one of its inputs be from a
>random number generator.
>
>The HLUT is simply a huge if-then-else table, each line
>being of the form:
>
> If [such and such happens] then [do this]
> Else if [this other thing happens] then [do that]
> .
> .
> .
>
>Such a table doesn't presuppose that the world is
>deterministic.
>
Daryl, tell me if you agree with this. To consider this
HLUT different from a recording such as the one I
proposed, we must find a way of putting this HLUT
into the world and exercise its I/O with context
dependent entries. If we can't do this, then this
HLUT is, in practice, just a recorder.
I see you don't want to face the HLUT as a simple
recorder. Then, if we put this HLUT into the world,
it is expected to behave intelligently. That's
the problem I'm starting to be aware of. The world is not
deterministic. That means that *eventually* one of the
if/then rules that the HLUT has *may not* work
the way expected. This deviation will be cumulative
and I expect that in a few minutes of living in this
world that HLUT will behave as a random number
generator (imagine that controlling a strong robot :-).
If you ask me to formalize this, I'll say I can't do it.
But I can propose a thought experiment that can help
understand better my point. Lets forget HLUTs for a while.
Suppose that, by an act of "magic", when you was born
that same "Goedel-free" god I mentioned earlier made a
"quark by quark" description of your entire baby body,
brain included. Life continued and now you're X years old.
Now suppose that this god rewound the universe to the
exact position, down again to the quark, that it had
during your birth. Suppose now that, without altering
the indeterminacy principle and the laws of physics we're
used, you have been "instantiated" again in that universe.
Everything is the same as before, even the baby you.
What is the probability that you would develop to
the exact (or even close) condition you had with X
years old on your previous life? I'd say zilch.
Unless the universe is deterministic, which doesn't
seem to be true.
Regards,
Sergio Navega.
From: daryl@cogentex.com (Daryl McCullough)
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 05 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
Message-ID: <7bp9qr$hif@edrn.newsguy.com>
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Sergio says...
>Suppose that, by an act of "magic", when you was born
>that same "Goedel-free" god I mentioned earlier made a
>"quark by quark" description of your entire baby body,
>brain included. Life continued and now you're X years old.
>
>Now suppose that this god rewound the universe to the
>exact position, down again to the quark, that it had
>during your birth. Suppose now that, without altering
>the indeterminacy principle and the laws of physics we're
>used, you have been "instantiated" again in that universe.
>Everything is the same as before, even the baby you.
>
>What is the probability that you would develop to
>the exact (or even close) condition you had with X
>years old on your previous life? I'd say zilch.
>Unless the universe is deterministic, which doesn't
>seem to be true.
Right. The world is not deterministic. I don't understand
what that has to do with anything. The HLUT doesn't
assume that the world is deterministic.
Daryl McCullough
CoGenTex, Inc.
Ithaca, NY
From: "Sergio Navega" <snavega@ibm.net>
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 05 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
Message-ID: <36e0464c@news3.us.ibm.net>
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Daryl McCullough wrote in message <7bp9qr$hif@edrn.newsguy.com>...
>Sergio says...
>
>>Suppose that, by an act of "magic", when you was born
>>that same "Goedel-free" god I mentioned earlier made a
>>"quark by quark" description of your entire baby body,
>>brain included. Life continued and now you're X years old.
>>
>>Now suppose that this god rewound the universe to the
>>exact position, down again to the quark, that it had
>>during your birth. Suppose now that, without altering
>>the indeterminacy principle and the laws of physics we're
>>used, you have been "instantiated" again in that universe.
>>Everything is the same as before, even the baby you.
>>
>>What is the probability that you would develop to
>>the exact (or even close) condition you had with X
>>years old on your previous life? I'd say zilch.
>>Unless the universe is deterministic, which doesn't
>>seem to be true.
>
>Right. The world is not deterministic. I don't understand
>what that has to do with anything. The HLUT doesn't
>assume that the world is deterministic.
>
Lets go again one step at a time. You obviously agree
that there is an imaginary HLUT whose entries are I/O
pairs (if/then conditions) representing the "intelligent"
acts throughout the life of one specific human being.
Lets say that there is such a thing.
Take this HLUT. Put it to perform in the world (execute its
if/then conditions), under the exact same initial conditions
of that human being. What I'm inclined to believe is that, after
a short time, it will not present behavior that can be
considered intelligent, let alone reproduce the behavior
of that original human being.
Regards,
Sergio Navega.
From: daryl@cogentex.com (Daryl McCullough)
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 05 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
Message-ID: <7bpkbo$5r2@edrn.newsguy.com>
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Sergio says...
>Lets go again one step at a time. You obviously agree
>that there is an imaginary HLUT whose entries are I/O
>pairs (if/then conditions) representing the "intelligent"
>acts throughout the life of one specific human being.
More than that; for each *possible* history of inputs
for a human being, the HLUT gives an action that is an
intelligent response. So it contains much more information
than the history of i/o pairs for any one human's lifetime.
>Take this HLUT. Put it to perform in the world (execute its
>if/then conditions), under the exact same initial conditions
>of that human being. What I'm inclined to believe is that, after
>a short time, it will not present behavior that can be
>considered intelligent, let alone reproduce the behavior
>of that original human being.
Let me try to clarify the meaning of the HLUT a little
further. Let's suppose that the person we are trying to
reproduce is called "Sergio". By assumption, for every
history H of inputs that Sergio could possibly receive,
there is an action A that Sergio could plausibly have
made in response to history H such that <H,A> is an
entry in the HLUT. ("Plausibly" in this case
means both that it is intelligent, and that it is in
keeping with Sergio's personality, abilities, etc.)
Now, when this HLUT runs, what it is constantly doingusing
its sensors to figure out what history H it is
in, and then outputs the corresponding A. By the time it
outputs A, the history has changed (more inputs have
arrived) and the history is now not H but H'. So the HLUT
finds the corresponding A' and outputs *that*. And so on.
What you seem to be saying is that the HLUT will fail
to behave intelligently, and more specifically will fail
to behave like Sergio after some period of time. What does
that mean? To me, to fail to behave like Sergio is to perform
some action A which Sergio would never have performed in
similar circumstances. But by assumption, the output A
*is* an action that Sergio would plausibly have performed
in such circumstances! So by definition, the HLUT cannot
fail to behave like Sergio (at least to the extent that
the HLUT's "circumstances" are determined by the history
of inputs it has received).
So I don't understand what you mean.
Daryl McCullough
CoGenTex, Inc.
Ithaca, NY
From: "Sergio Navega" <snavega@ibm.net>
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 06 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
Message-ID: <36e139fd@news3.us.ibm.net>
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Things are getting interesting...
Daryl McCullough wrote in message <7bpkbo$5r2@edrn.newsguy.com>...
>Sergio says...
>
>>Lets go again one step at a time. You obviously agree
>>that there is an imaginary HLUT whose entries are I/O
>>pairs (if/then conditions) representing the "intelligent"
>>acts throughout the life of one specific human being.
>
>More than that; for each *possible* history of inputs
>for a human being, the HLUT gives an action that is an
>intelligent response. So it contains much more information
>than the history of i/o pairs for any one human's lifetime.
>
This is equivalent to think that the universe is deterministic
and that the HLUT can be completely addressed with the inputs
it receives. I'll develop these points below.
>>Take this HLUT. Put it to perform in the world (execute its
>>if/then conditions), under the exact same initial conditions
>>of that human being. What I'm inclined to believe is that, after
>>a short time, it will not present behavior that can be
>>considered intelligent, let alone reproduce the behavior
>>of that original human being.
>
>Let me try to clarify the meaning of the HLUT a little
>further. Let's suppose that the person we are trying to
>reproduce is called "Sergio". By assumption, for every
>history H of inputs that Sergio could possibly receive,
>there is an action A that Sergio could plausibly have
>made in response to history H such that <H,A> is an
>entry in the HLUT. ("Plausibly" in this case
>means both that it is intelligent, and that it is in
>keeping with Sergio's personality, abilities, etc.)
>
>Now, when this HLUT runs, what it is constantly doing
>is using its sensors to figure out what history H it is
>in, and then outputs the corresponding A. By the time it
>outputs A, the history has changed (more inputs have
>arrived) and the history is now not H but H'. So the HLUT
>finds the corresponding A' and outputs *that*. And so on.
>
That's not only unlikely, it is *impossible*.
The root of the question is that inputs H inform the
HLUT of only a humongously minimal situation of the world
in that moment.
Suppose that the HLUT received input H, the world is in a
condition W (meaning the world have a determinate set of
atoms positions, velocities, spins, etc) and the HLUT answers with
A. Now suppose that it receives H1, to which it answers A1 and
so on. What you're saying is that if we run this HLUT
*again*, and supposing that we restart the universe from the
exact same conditions, the answer A1 would be always appropriate.
That will not work, because the world may have evolved differently
and action A1, appropriate in the previous instance, may not
be appropriate now. And to know that this is not appropriate
now, you'd have to know *all* the state of the universe to
decide. The past history of H is not enough! The world
goes by itself, never repeating! The past history is useless!
(detail: only for the HLUT, not for an intelligent brain).
This would only be possible if the HLUT had access to the
*COMPLETE* state of the universe (W). But the HLUT "sees" the
universe through an extremely infinitesimal window (H). You're
trying to make the HLUT perform as if it had complete access
to the evolution of the status of the world (all atoms, all
velocities, all spins of electrons, etc). That's not possible,
even in our most wild dreams. I'll try to suggest a more
intuitive thought experiment later.
>What you seem to be saying is that the HLUT will fail
>to behave intelligently, and more specifically will fail
>to behave like Sergio after some period of time. What does
>that mean? To me, to fail to behave like Sergio is to perform
>some action A which Sergio would never have performed in
>similar circumstances. But by assumption, the output A
>*is* an action that Sergio would plausibly have performed
>in such circumstances! So by definition, the HLUT cannot
>fail to behave like Sergio (at least to the extent that
>the HLUT's "circumstances" are determined by the history
>of inputs it has received).
>
>So I don't understand what you mean.
>
Again, this only demonstrates that HLUTs are static recordings
and that playing them back ("executing" them) will not
reproduce the same behaviors in this world we're in.
Daryl, do you understand that what you're proposing would only
be possible if the universe was deterministic? If you
put this HLUT to run again, on the same universe, it will
not present the same behavior, because the universe is
nondeterministic.
If this HLUT, by definition, will behave like Sergio and if
this HLUT is able to behave like Sergio if it runs again, then
that means that this HLUT have, as entries, all possible
conditions of all possible atoms in the universe in all
possible positions, velocities, interaction with each other,
etc. Is that right? Do you think that this would work?
I claim that *even* in this situation, *it will not work*!!!
Even if constructed this way, the HLUT will not be able to
do it right. Because to do that, the entries H we would have to
provide to the HLUT would have to include *all the current
status of the universe in that moment*, so that it can be
used as address inside the HLUT to come up with the *right*
answer A.
But, by definition, we are receiving *just* a vector H, with an
absurdly limited vision of this universe (besides, the sensors
who provide H have an accuracy very far from the quantum
positions and attributes of the atoms).
So this is impossible. And the effects on the potential answers
for behavior are dramatic.
Now let me try to find a more "down to earth" example. See if
you agree with me here:
Take a coin, put it in the palm of your hand, face up. Now
gently throw it in the air in such a way as to make it give
exactly one complete turn, falling face up again in your
hand. I guess that everybody is able to do this in a very
predictable manner.
Now do the same thing, but this time, make it give two turns
and fall again face up. Things get a little bit more difficult
but I guess that after some training, one can be confident in
getting this right.
Do the same thing again with three turns, then four. There is
a certain number where no human will be able to control that
with precision. Don't give up yet.
Build a *highly accurate* robot hand which is able to work in
a sealed, very controlled environment. Make it turn the coin
for 10 times. Now 20, then 50, and then 500 times. I think it is
not very difficult to believe that there is a number of turns "n"
above what *no mechanism*, no matter how precise, would give a face
up coin with probability *better than chance*. Why this? Because
we've got to the atomic and quantum limits of our world (the
coin is losing atoms of nickel when it turns in the air!)
Is this example too much contrived? Not at all! Everything we're
living right now is the result of the interactions on this level.
This is not an exception, it is the rule!
How's the weather today there? I bet that if it's raining you would
reluct going out. On the other hand, if it's a sunny day, you will
finish reading this message and you may consider going for a walk
in the park. Your behavior is affected by the way the weather is
now, right?.
You're proposing that a HLUT can capture this behavior, which
means, capture all atmospheric variations since you've born and
predict what the weather will be today. You're also assuming that
if we "start this world again", we will obtain the *same* weather
we're having now.
If I had to summarize all this post in a single phrase, I'd say
that a HLUT doesn't "know" that sunny days are good for a walk
at the park!
Regards,
Sergio Navega.
P.S: By the way, you may be wondering how our brain is able to
perform reasonably in such an unpredictable world. I'd remember
what Neil said elsewhere, that's *exactly* what intelligence is
about!
From: "Gary Forbis" <forbis@accessone.com>
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 06 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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Sergio Navega wrote in message <36e139fd@news3.us.ibm.net>...
...
>Suppose that the HLUT received input H, the world is in a
>condition W (meaning the world have a determinate set of
>atoms positions, velocities, spins, etc) and the HLUT answers with
>A. Now suppose that it receives H1, to which it answers A1 and
>so on. What you're saying is that if we run this HLUT
>*again*, and supposing that we restart the universe from the
>exact same conditions, the answer A1 would be always appropriate.
OK, I understand this.
>That will not work, because the world may have evolved differently
>and action A1, appropriate in the previous instance, may not
>be appropriate now.
But I don't understand this.
>And to know that this is not appropriate
>now, you'd have to know *all* the state of the universe to
>decide. The past history of H is not enough! The world
>goes by itself, never repeating! The past history is useless!
>(detail: only for the HLUT, not for an intelligent brain).
And I disagree with this.
Here's why...
The human brain doesn't have access to the world except through its
senses, that is, it's input. We don't know anything about the world
we were not born with or learned.
The HLUT is just a set of input stream, output stream pairs. Since
the brain is able to produce appropriate output based upon state and
input then, provided there is a fininte number of possible inputs and
outputs,
so should the HLUT.
What you appear to be proposing is the human brain can produce
different and appropriate output based upon differences in the universe
to which it does not have access.
>This would only be possible if the HLUT had access to the
>*COMPLETE* state of the universe (W). But the HLUT "sees" the
>universe through an extremely infinitesimal window (H). You're
>trying to make the HLUT perform as if it had complete access
>to the evolution of the status of the world (all atoms, all
>velocities, all spins of electrons, etc). That's not possible,
>even in our most wild dreams.
How does this differ from the human brain? Do you suppose it
has complete access to W?
>I'll try to suggest a more intuitive thought experiment later.
...
a nice example of how quantum effects have global consequenses
deleted.
>How's the weather today there? I bet that if it's raining you would
>reluct going out. On the other hand, if it's a sunny day, you will
>finish reading this message and you may consider going for a walk
>in the park. Your behavior is affected by the way the weather is
>now, right?.
>
>You're proposing that a HLUT can capture this behavior, which
>means, capture all atmospheric variations since you've born and
>predict what the weather will be today. You're also assuming that
>if we "start this world again", we will obtain the *same* weather
>we're having now.
I don't think the brain predicts weather so I don't know why the HLUT
would have to in order to produce the appropraite behavior.
>If I had to summarize all this post in a single phrase, I'd say
>that a HLUT doesn't "know" that sunny days are good for a walk
>at the park!
I don't know how human brains know these things either if one
proposes personal history is insufficient to make such determinations.
>P.S: By the way, you may be wondering how our brain is able to
>perform reasonably in such an unpredictable world. I'd remember
>what Neil said elsewhere, that's *exactly* what intelligence is
>about!
The HLUT shouldn't be subject to any greater unpredictability than
the human brain. You've convinced me the HLUT could be intelligent
even if it doesn't have phenomenal existence but only noumenal existence.
(No one's saying an HLUT could actually exist, this is a thought
experiment.)
From: "Sergio Navega" <snavega@ibm.net>
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 08 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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Gary, thanks for the comments, it will give me the opportunity to
readdress the arguments. I have arranged a bit your comments in
order to ease my responses.
Gary Forbis wrote in message <7brsgr$shl$1@remarQ.com>...
>
>The human brain doesn't have access to the world except through its
>senses, that is, it's input. We don't know anything about the world
>we were not born with or learned.
>
Agreed. And according to the specification of the thought experiment,
the HLUT do not have access to the world other than by a similar
method. What I claimed is that a HLUT, to present intelligent
behavior, would have to have access to all the states of the universe
(all positions of atoms, all spins, all velocities, etc). More on
this follows.
>The HLUT is just a set of input stream, output stream pairs. Since
>the brain is able to produce appropriate output based upon state and
>input then, provided there is a fininte number of possible inputs and
>outputs, so should the HLUT.
>
The first question here is, can we find a HLUT which is equivalent
to the behaviors presented by an intelligent brain? Yes, I do not
discuss that, one way of coming up with that is doing a recording
of all I/O pairs of the life of that person.
Now, can we put *this specific HLUT* to run in the world and obtain
comparable intelligent behavior? My answer to this is NO!
>What you appear to be proposing is the human brain can produce
>different and appropriate output based upon differences in the universe
>to which it does not have access.
If you mean different and more appropriate than the HLUT, yes, that's
what I'm saying: the brain is able to produce intelligent behavior
*even* without knowing the full state of the universe. The HLUT,
on the same conditions, can't. The brain can work very fine without
knowing the positions, spins and velocities of all matter in the
universe. The HLUT can't.
>
>I don't think the brain predicts weather so I don't know why the HLUT
>would have to in order to produce the appropraite behavior.
>
Gary, take a look through your window. What do you see? Maybe some clouds,
maybe the sun. Could you consider that a good weather? Lets suppose yes.
So, if invited, you'd go for a walk in the park.
Now feed that same image that entered your vision in a HLUT programmed
to behave like you. The HLUT will take each pixel (whatever resolution),
add that to the complete history of inputs you had and use that as
an address to the big, humongous table. This will return an entry(ies)
that is the set of behavioral answers equivalent, for example, to the
act of walking toward the park.
Now, like a god, do the following: put a very small, but visible, "leg"
in one of the clouds of your sky. That would not interfere in your
humanly decision of going for a walk. So, neither should it do to the
HLUT. But to allow that, the HLUT would have to map a *different* set of
pixels (which means, a different HLUT input address) to the *same*
behavior (even if stored as another entry). Do you understand where
we're getting at?
How many changes can I devise in that picture in order to have what
can be considered a sunny day? All of them would have to be represented
as *individual entries* in the HLUT. That could mean a lot, lot more
of space, but still feasible. Is that so?
Do you agree that your behavior would be different if you'd broken your
leg yesterday? Even with a sunny day, you would reluct going for a walk.
Unless, of course, that in the day before yesterday you met with a
gorgeous "dream" blonde that set a date with you on the park today.
That would make you go for a walk even if it were raining. But wait,
10 years ago you had a similar experience with a blonde that was part
of a group of thieves and you promised for yourself never go after that
kind of "mermaid sing" again. But you must be told that you have been
victimized 10 years ago because the group choose to attack you, and not
the guy that passed 1 second earlier. And that happened because the
traffic sign of the 5th avenue went "nuts" for a "complete" 300
miliseconds
and made you loose those precious seconds that could have prevented
you from being there at the time of the robbery. I must add that the
traffic sign lost those 0,3 secs because a fly got in the middle of
the mechanism. That fly, by the way, were not meant to be there,
because that butterfly was crossing and then...
You see, your behavior today regarding that walk in the park is
a *direct* function of that butterfly 10 years ago. This does
not makes part of your vector H of input experiences. Sounds crazy?
A HLUT can, obviously, store all these conditions, provided that
this HLUT model the *entire universe*, atom by atom, spin by spin,
velocity by velocity. So you may ask, what is it that our brain
does that a HLUT cannot?
The essential aspect is that a brain can understand the invariant
aspects of the experiences it is subject to.
By doing that, a brain will not care about the shape of the clouds to
consider a day appropriate for a walk or not. The brain *reduces*
the complexity of the universe, a HLUT do not. Without reducing
the complexity (which could be translated to categorizing the universe,
grouping similar experiences in the same umbrella, using induction to
come up with generalizing principles), one would not be able to
present intelligent behavior.
>I don't know how human brains know these things either if one
>proposes personal history is insufficient to make such determinations.
Because what the brain stores is not personal histories. The brain
stores personal invariants, things that help it classify new
experiences according to previous ones. Part of this is done through
perception. When you try to define things (a cup, for example), you
present the essential, fixed, "important" aspects of cups you have seen.
A HLUT is unable to come up with such a definition. Given a generic
cup in a world (which means a new situation in an unpredictable
environment), you know what you can do (the behaviors you can
express), given your desires. A HLUT can't do that without knowing
the full universe.
Regards,
Sergio Navega.
From: houlepn@my-dejanews.com
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 08 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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"Sergio Navega" <snavega@ibm.net> wrote:
> Things are getting interesting...
>
> Daryl McCullough wrote in message <7bpkbo$5r2@edrn.newsguy.com>...
> >Sergio says...
> >
> >> Lets go again one step at a time. You obviously agree
> >> that there is an imaginary HLUT whose entries are I/O
> >> pairs (if/then conditions) representing the "intelligent"
> >> acts throughout the life of one specific human being.
> >
> > More than that; for each *possible* history of inputs
> > for a human being, the HLUT gives an action that is an
> > intelligent response. So it contains much more information
> > than the history of i/o pairs for any one human's lifetime.
> >
>
> This is equivalent to think that the universe is deterministic
> and that the HLUT can be completely addressed with the inputs
> it receives. I'll develop these points below.
>
> >> Take this HLUT. Put it to perform in the world (execute its
> >> if/then conditions), under the exact same initial conditions
> >> of that human being. What I'm inclined to believe is that, after
> >> a short time, it will not present behavior that can be
> >> considered intelligent, let alone reproduce the behavior
> >> of that original human being.
> >
> > Let me try to clarify the meaning of the HLUT a little
> > further. Let's suppose that the person we are trying to
> > reproduce is called "Sergio". By assumption, for every
> > history H of inputs that Sergio could possibly receive,
> > there is an action A that Sergio could plausibly have
> > made in response to history H such that <H,A> is an
> > entry in the HLUT. ("Plausibly" in this case
> > means both that it is intelligent, and that it is in
> > keeping with Sergio's personality, abilities, etc.)
> >
> > Now, when this HLUT runs, what it is constantly doing
> > is using its sensors to figure out what history H it is
> > in, and then outputs the corresponding A. By the time it
> > outputs A, the history has changed (more inputs have
> > arrived) and the history is now not H but H'. So the HLUT
> > finds the corresponding A' and outputs *that*. And so on.
> >
>
> That's not only unlikely, it is *impossible*.
Ok. I read your response and it seems it would be a valid counter
to Daryl's argument if his HLUT (with a finite alphabet input)
was meant to reproduce the exact behavior of the actual 'Sergio'
but he just claims to define 'Sergio like' capabilities. I'll try to
indicate how this is relevant in what follows...
> The root of the question is that inputs H inform the
> HLUT of only a humongously minimal situation of the world
> in that moment.
Indeed, but that just reduces the size of the HLUT and its sensibility,
not necessarily its 'intelligence' and ability to produce 'Sergio like'
behavior. Note that the real Sergio's mind also has access to a
humongously small amount of information about the world and would
often be expected to exhibit the same behavior in similar circumstances.
For instance, in your example below, he might choose not to have a walk
in the park if the weather is bad irrespective of whether this is due
to some butterfly flapping it's wings in Honolulu one week earlier or to
some cockroach falling from a counter top in Stockholm. Neil's
objection seems rather to be about the very discriminative power of
Sergio's brain and sensory system due to the particular circumstances of
their development. This objection is interesting but I will first attempt
to address your own objections.
> Suppose that the HLUT received input H, the world is in a
> condition W (meaning the world have a determinate set of
> atoms positions, velocities, spins, etc) and the HLUT answers with
> A. Now suppose that it receives H1, to which it answers A1 and
> so on. What you're saying is that if we run this HLUT
> *again*, and supposing that we restart the universe from the
> exact same conditions, the answer A1 would be always appropriate.
The universe might follow a different history but then the HLUT will
be provided with a different input. Answer A1 is only given if the
universe follows history H1.
> That will not work, because the world may have evolved differently
Then its history will not be H1.
> and action A1, appropriate in the previous instance, may not
> be appropriate now. And to know that this is not appropriate
> now, you'd have to know *all* the state of the universe to
> decide. The past history of H is not enough! The world
> goes by itself, never repeating! The past history is useless!
> (detail: only for the HLUT, not for an intelligent brain).
Why? Both have a limited access to the state of the universe.
Note that although Sergio's answers might be affected by infinitesimal
perturbations (due to his brain being subjected to internal and external
non linear dynamic processes) he still only has access to it's past history
as a basis to make intelligent answers. The presence of more
bifurcations in phase space does not necessarily lead to a larger
HLUT (as in the butterfly/cockroach example) if the only goal of the
HLUT is to emulate Sergio like capabilities and not reproduce the exact
answers the actual Sergio would have given in the exact same circumstances.
[snip]
> But, by definition, we are receiving *just* a vector H, with an
> absurdly limited vision of this universe (besides, the sensors
> who provide H have an accuracy very far from the quantum
> positions and attributes of the atoms).
It seems to me this vector H is no more limited than a vector
representing all of Sergio's synaptic connection strengths (for
instance). They both are absurdly limited representations of the
universe. The current state of your brain and what you read on
your computer screen nevertheless provide enough context for you
to formulate intelligent answers.
[snip]
> Regards,
> Sergio Navega.
>
> P.S: By the way, you may be wondering how our brain is able to
> perform reasonably in such an unpredictable world. I'd remember
> what Neil said elsewhere, that's *exactly* what intelligence is
> about!
I think that Neil's main objection is that a static discrete alphabet
is inappropriate to define human behavior. It is certainly true that
the humans nervous system does not have a complete immutable alphabet
for I/Os specified by its DNA. This however does not appear to rule
out all the possibility to map Sergio's intelligence to a HLUT (in
principle, not in practice) if we either 1) restrict ourselves to some
period of time in which the high level alphabet does not change appreciably
(Sergio does not learn a new language) or 2) if we choose as an alphabet
a description of the I/Os at a lower more elementary level possibly ahead
of Sergio's sensory organs. Finally, I would say Neil's objection seems
to be directed more to the HLUT's apparent lack of long term biological
plasticity and thus ability to exhibit general intelligence in the long
run. I don't believe the quantum mechanical HLUT I presented earlier
suffer from this flaw but upon request I am willing to update it so as
to match more explicitly Neil's challenge (of which I just became aware
in browsing earlier posts of this thread with dejanews).
Regards,
Pierre-Normand Houle
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From: "Sergio Navega" <snavega@ibm.net>
Subject: Re: An HLUT challenge.
Date: 08 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
Message-ID: <36e3ee95@news3.us.ibm.net>
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Pierre, sorry, I have again started my answers in another post
and developed my arguments there. If you don't mind, take a look
at my answer to Gary. I promise that next time I'll start with
your post. However, there are some points I'd like to comment here.
houlepn@my-dejanews.com wrote in message
<7bvj56$5vv$1@nnrp1.dejanews.com>...
>"Sergio Navega" <snavega@ibm.net> wrote:
>
>> The root of the question is that inputs H inform the
>> HLUT of only a humongously minimal situation of the world
>> in that moment.
>
>Indeed, but that just reduces the size of the HLUT and its sensibility,
>not necessarily its 'intelligence' and ability to produce 'Sergio like'
>behavior. Note that the real Sergio's mind also has access to a
>humongously small amount of information about the world and would
>often be expected to exhibit the same behavior in similar circumstances.
>For instance, in your example below, he might choose not to have a walk
>in the park if the weather is bad irrespective of whether this is due
>to some butterfly flapping it's wings in Honolulu one week earlier or to
>some cockroach falling from a counter top in Stockholm.
What I'd like to discuss is when he *chooses* to go to a walk in the
park *in spite* of a bad weather! This argument could be easily left
aside by some sort of indeterminacy of emotions of unpredictability
of human behavior.
But I'd like to stick with a very rationalist analysis here, for the
sake of my arguments: he may have chosen to go to a walk because he
noticed that all his prior walks to a park on a sunny day had some
sort of problem (robbery, too crowded, skin burns, etc), and his
only one previous experience of walking in the rain was very
pleasant. How is a HLUT supposed to decide about this?
>Neil's
>objection seems rather to be about the very discriminative power of
>Sergio's brain and sensory system due to the particular circumstances of
>their development. This objection is interesting but I will first attempt
>to address your own objections.
>
My starting point for the HLUT argument is now the same as of Neil's
(as a matter of fact, things "settled" in my mind when I read a response
Neil has given to someone else). From that common starting point, Neil
develops his thoughts to another direction. I'm still on the purely
HLUT aspect. Another thing I find important in Neil's vision is that
the HLUT story, no matter if impractical, convoluted and mind-boggling,
demonstrates one of the essential points behind intelligent behavior.
In my answer to Gary (to which I report you), I give another
hypothetical situation which makes it clear the following points:
a) I agree that there is a HLUT able to represent all the intelligent
action/reactions of any intelligent being.
b) I do *not* agree that such a HLUT, if made to run in the world, will
present intelligent behavior (let alone model a specific person), unless...
c)...the HLUT stores *all physical parameters* from all atoms and ions in
the universe.
But I must confess, Pierre, that I'm not satisfied with even these
conditions. I think they are too "weak" (meaning that even with all
those conditions, I'd doubt that a HLUT would be intelligent). So let me
propose the following situation:
Take Einstein's HLUT. It is a recording of all input/output of all
experiences and behaviors lived by Einstein. Put this HLUT into a
hypothetical "computer", able to receive I/O pairs. Show this
computer the experience of a metal ball bouncing when thrown
to a wall. Now do the same thing with a nylon ball (something
Einstein didn't know, *but it looks like a rubber or wood ball*).
The ball bounces differently. Ask Einstein's HLUT to explain the
phenomena. It'll not.
>> Suppose that the HLUT received input H, the world is in a
>> condition W (meaning the world have a determinate set of
>> atoms positions, velocities, spins, etc) and the HLUT answers with
>> A. Now suppose that it receives H1, to which it answers A1 and
>> so on. What you're saying is that if we run this HLUT
>> *again*, and supposing that we restart the universe from the
>> exact same conditions, the answer A1 would be always appropriate.
>
>The universe might follow a different history but then the HLUT will
>be provided with a different input. Answer A1 is only given if the
>universe follows history H1.
>
Pierre, do you see that if we provide a different set of input
histories, then we're talking about a different HLUT? You may
propose that we can meld together all these possible HLUTs,
giving the definitive big HLUT. I'd say that even this won't
be enough to provide intelligent behavior.
What's different in a period of 10 years starting 1990 and 10 years
starting 1980 and starting 1960 and 1860 and 1512? Everything and
nothing.
Everything:
There isn't a single frame of visual pixels equal in all those periods
(lets say, the probability is humongously close to zero). This means
that we don't have sets of H vetors equal among these years. This
means we'd have to have *different* HLUTs for each situation, and
that means that this group of HLUTs will not be complete, because
the *future* 10 years will have another set, and 1000 years later
even another one...
Nothing:
Nothing is different, it's all the same, the same law of gravitation,
the same day/night cycle, the same atmospheric composition, the same
boiling point of water. All those HLUTs were not able to present
*any* kind of behavior that were dependent on any of these constant
characteristics. Yet, this is what I think is missing in a HLUT:
perception of what is regular.
>> That will not work, because the world may have evolved differently
>
>Then its history will not be H1.
>
Then, to present the same answer A1 given a history H1', it will have
to be *another HLUT*, unless we devise an HLUT that can have all
possible HLUTs, and this means stuffing *all* the universe (atoms,
velocities, spins, etc) in a HLUT.
>> and action A1, appropriate in the previous instance, may not
>> be appropriate now. And to know that this is not appropriate
>> now, you'd have to know *all* the state of the universe to
>> decide. The past history of H is not enough! The world
>> goes by itself, never repeating! The past history is useless!
>> (detail: only for the HLUT, not for an intelligent brain).
>
>Why? Both have a limited access to the state of the universe.
>Note that although Sergio's answers might be affected by infinitesimal
>perturbations (due to his brain being subjected to internal and external
>non linear dynamic processes) he still only has access to it's past history
>as a basis to make intelligent answers. The presence of more
>bifurcations in phase space does not necessarily lead to a larger
>HLUT (as in the butterfly/cockroach example) if the only goal of the
>HLUT is to emulate Sergio like capabilities and not reproduce the exact
>answers the actual Sergio would have given in the exact same circumstances.
>
Such a HLUT cannot reproduce Sergio's behavior, more than that, it cannot
do anything that is intelligent.
The point here is the opposite of what we're thinking. I'm not discussing
that there couldn't exist a HLUT large enough to store all the information
necessary. The question is almost the opposite: in which way we devise a
mechanism to store as few as possible in order to allow it to *predict*
future outcomes.
The thing here is not the past. A videocassette does that. The question
is, given a *new* input vector Hn, how is the HLUT supposed to come
with an intelligent behavior, if it does not have any correspondent
entry?
A HLUT cannot do that. So a HLUT cannot behave intelligently, let alone
behave as Sergio (I'm not sure if this is good or bad :-).
>[snip]
>
>> Regards,
>> Sergio Navega.
>>
>> P.S: By the way, you may be wondering how our brain is able to
>> perform reasonably in such an unpredictable world. I'd remember
>> what Neil said elsewhere, that's *exactly* what intelligence is
>> about!
>
>I think that Neil's main objection is that a static discrete alphabet
>is inappropriate to define human behavior. It is certainly true that
>the humans nervous system does not have a complete immutable alphabet
>for I/Os specified by its DNA. This however does not appear to rule
>out all the possibility to map Sergio's intelligence to a HLUT (in
>principle, not in practice) if we either 1) restrict ourselves to some
>period of time in which the high level alphabet does not change appreciably
>(Sergio does not learn a new language) or 2) if we choose as an alphabet
>a description of th